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In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to 
which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional 
features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main 
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neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both 
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condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a 
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The Mark of the Mental 
Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin, Italy) 
 
0. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to 
which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional 
features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main 
part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, 
neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both 
necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered down’ counterpart 
recently defended by Tim Crane, according to which intentionality is just the necessary 
condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a 
heterogenous category. For there may be another mark of the mental, i.e., 
consciousness, in the phenomenological sense of the property of being experienced. 
 The architecture of the paper is the following. In Section 1, I will sketch the 
intentionalist programme in all its ramifications and show how it can be dismantled, by 
defending the idea that there are mental states that have only qualitative but no 
intentional features. In Section 2, I will attack what I take to be the best version of 
intentionalism, namely Crane’s version, according to which there are no merely 
qualitative states for all qualitative states possess the minimal features that endow a 
mental state with intentionality, namely the possible non-existence of the intentional 
object of a state and the aspectual shape of such a state. I will indeed try to show that 
there are mental states, namely moods and especially proprioceptive sensations, which 
fail to have both such minimal features. Finally in Section 3 I will try to sketch up to 
what extent consciousness, or better to be experienced, can be the mark of the mental. 
 
1. What the intentionalist programme amounts to and how it can be dismantled 
 
As is well known, Franz Brentano claimed that intentionality – the property of being 
about something or of having a propositional intentional content, i.e., a content that 
makes its bearer semantically evaluable (true or false, fulfilled or unfulfilled) – is the 
mark of the mental, i.e., the both necessary and sufficient condition that makes 
something a mental state.1 By so appealing to intentionality, Brentano wanted to support 
the idea that that there is a class of states, mental states, which are irreducible to entities 
of any other kind, primarily physical states.2 Yet let me well put this intended 
consequence aside. For nowadays it already appears that Brentano’s claim seems hard 
to defend. For its sufficiency claim seems problematic: over and above mental states, 
there seem to be other things that possess intentionality, whether they are physical states 
or not.3 Nevertheless, Brentano’s claim may be kept in a weakened form, according to 
1 Cf. Brentano (1874:88-9). Following Crane (2001:39), I won’t stress here any difference between 
mental states and mental events. 
2 To be sure, by “physical states” Brentano had something very idiosyncratic in mind, i.e., phenomenal 
states. Cf. Crane (2006). Yet let me put this point aside. 
3 Crane (1998:230-1)  points out that if one appeals to a naturalistic approach to intentionality, then some 
physical states, or at least some biological states, may well have intentionality. But even apart from such 
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which intentionality merely is the necessary condition of the mental: for every x, if x is a 
mental state, then x has intentionality. In this weakened form, the claim is nowadays 
defended by Crane – let me thus call this claim in its weakened form the Brentano-
Crane thesis (BC).4  
 If (BC) holds, then there are no states that are mental but do not possess 
intentionality. In particular, there are no merely qualitative mental states, i.e., states that 
have only qualitative features, that is, features that are relevant for the so-called 
phenomenal character of a state, for what it is like to be in such a state. So, defenders of 
(BC) also defend representationalism, or intentionalism, (from now on, I will use the 
latter label only) about qualitative states; namely, the thesis that the allegedly qualitative 
properties of mental states are identical with, or at least supervene on, the 
representational, or intentional, properties of such states, i.e., the properties including 
the fact that such states have intentionality.5 For, if there are no merely qualitative 
mental states, there are not even states whose qualitative properties neither are identical 
with nor supervene on intentional properties.  
 On its turn, as Crane has shown,6 intentionalism may be modulated in different 
ways, depending on how, on the one hand, the relationship between qualitative and 
intentional properties is conceived and, on the other hand, what intentional properties 
exactly are. As to the first modulation, intentionalism may be meant in a strong form, 
according to which the qualitative properties of a state are identical with or at least 
necessarily supervene on its intentional properties, but also in a weak form, according to 
which the allegedly qualitative states have not only qualitative properties but also 
intentional ones, so that the former properties merely factually supervene on the latter 
ones. As to the second modulation, intentionalism can be pure, impure, or spurious 
intentionalism, depending respectively on whether intentional properties basically 
center around the very intentionality property of being about something or of having a 
propositional intentional content (a content that is constituted in any of the possible 
ways it is conceived of in the literature)7, or they also include the property for a state of 
having an intentional mode, that is, of being the kind of intentional state it is (a belief 
rather than a desire, a visual rather than an auditory perception etc.), or simply shrink to 
an approach, one may hold that there are other entities over and above mental states that have 
intentionality. For instance, propositions qua structured entities are about their constituents. Cf. on this 
Sacchi-Voltolini (2013). 
4 Cf. Crane (1998, 2001, 2009). 
5 For Crane, intentionalism is the “view that all mental states exhibit intentionality” (2001:8). Strangely 
enough, in the relevant literature there is little reflection on the fact that, qua supervenience base for the 
qualitative properties, intentional properties have to include intentionality. A notable exception is 
Chalmers (2004), who first draws a distinction between represented properties, i.e., properties that 
constitute the (propositional) intentional content of a mental state, and representational properties, i.e., 
the properties of having such a content, and then says that, pace Dretske (1995) or Tye (1995), qualitative 
properties have to be brought back to representational rather than to mere represented properties. Now, as 
I said before, having a (propositional) intentional content precisely is one of the forms of intentionality. 
6 Cf. Crane (2001:83-5); the labels “pure” and “impure”, as applied to intentionalism, come from 
Chalmers (2004). 
7 Basically, a Russellian way according to which such a content is made only by the objects and the 
properties the state is about, a Fregean way according to which such a content is made only by the so-
called modes of presentation of such objects and properties, or a combination of the two above ways. 
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the property of having such a mode. The combinations of these modulations provide at 
least six ways of intentionalism.8 
 As to the first modulation, strong intentionalism clearly entails weak 
intentionalism but not the other way around: if an allegedly qualitative property either is 
identical with or necessarily supervenes on an intentional property, then of course it also 
factually supervenes on it, but the converse doesn’t hold. Both forms of intentionalism, 
however, have obviously to assume that, as I said above, the intentional properties of a 
state include the property of intentionality. Such an assumption also entails that, as to 
the second modulation, the three forms of intentionalism – pure, impure and spurious – 
are grounded forms of intentionalism only if the intentional properties they mobilize 
really contain the intentionality property. This constraint automatically allows both pure 
and impure intentionalism as legitimate forms of intentionalism, the former for 
according to it intentional properties are centered around the intentionality property and 
the latter for according to it intentional properties at least include the intentionality 
property. By the same vein, however, that constraint seems to rule out spurious 
intentionalism (this is why is so labeled), until one is able to show that appearances 
notwithstanding, the intentional mode of a state has an intimate relationship with its 
having intentionality.  
 This said, however, I don’t have to enter here into the delicate issue of which 
form of intentionalism is the best one. For the above assumption also shows that, if 
there is a mental state that does not possess intentionality, weak intentionalism fails, 
hence strong intentionalism fails as well, however either form of intentionalism is 
further meant – as pure, impure, or spurious (if it may so meant). This is what I want to 
show in what follows. I indeed want to show that there are mental states that only have, 
to put it in Block’s (1996) terms, mere mental latex, i.e., they are states that have 
qualitative properties that are matched by no intentional properties, for they have no 
intentionality at all.  
This is a moderate form of anti-intentionalism. That is, an anti-intentionalist has 
no need to show that – to put it still in Block’s (1996) terms – there is mental paint, or 
in other terms, that all mental states that have qualitative properties are such that these 
properties may not even merely match intentional properties of such states. It may 
indeed well be the case that there are states that have both qualitative and intentional 
features; not only (rather obviously) emotions, but also (less obviously) all the so-called 
esteroceptive sensations – visions, auditions, gustatory, olfactory and tactile sensations.9 
For in order to dismantle the supervenience claim that constitutes weak intentionalism – 
no phenomenal difference without an intentional difference – hence a fortiori to 
dismantle intentionalism in its strong form, it is enough to show that there are merely 
8 These combinations further proliferate if intentionalism is meant as a reductive form of intentionalism, 
according to which no qualitative properties at all figure in the properties that constitute the intentional 
properties of a state, or as a non-reductive form of intentionalism, according to which qualitative 
properties may still figure within such intentional properties. For this further complication cf. Chalmers 
(2004), Siewert (2004). 
9 Almost nobody maintains such a radical form of anti-intentionalism, for it is natural to maintain that 
most emotions have both a qualitative and an intentional side. Yet Antony (1997:25) is an exception. 
Both Kim (1996:13) and Rosenthal (1994:349) maintain the pretty traditional view that all sensations, 
both esteroceptive and interoceptive, or better proprioceptive, sensations, are merely qualitative states. 
Searle (1983:1-2, 1992:84), Rey (1998:441), Peacocke (2008:8-9,11) are moderate anti-intentionalists. 
 
                                                 
6 
 
qualitative states, i.e., states that only have qualitative properties that aren’t matched by 
intentional properties. As I’m going to show, both moods and interoceptive, or better 
proprioceptive, sensations are mental states of this kind. Since the existence of such 
states shows that there are mental states that have no intentionality, intentionality is not 
the mark of the mental. 
In the next Section, I will articulate my anti-intentionalist strategy as follows. 
First, I will enucleate what I take to be the most tenable of intentionalism, namely 
Crane’s (2001) version of it. Second, I will try to show why this version doesn’t work. 
 
2. Against Crane’s intentionalism 
 
To my mind, Crane (2001) offers the best way to argue for intentionalism. For Crane 
claims, first, that the matching between qualitative and intentional properties of a mental 
state is independent of the state’s having a propositional intentional content; it suffices 
that the state has an objectual intentional content, or in other terms, that the state 
extinguishes its intentionality in its being about a particular object. As a result of this 
claim, allegedly qualitative states can be treated as merely objectual intentional states, 
i.e., as states that merely possess reference intentionality – being about something – 
rather than content intentionality, having a propositional content to the effect that so-
and-so is the case.10 Typical examples of merely objectual intentional states are 
Othello’s being jealous of Desdemona or Vladimir’s looking for Godot.11 
This point is a great merit of Crane’s theory. For the propositional intentional 
content that is ascribed to qualitative states as what qualitative properties at least 
allegedly supervene on is often an artificial matter. Consider e.g. Tye’s (1995) thesis 
according to which a state’s painfulness amounts to the property for that state of having 
the propositional intentional content that a bodily tissue is damaged. Since according to 
Tye this is the (propositional) content a pain shares with a state bringing pleasure to 
someone’s else (a masochist, say),12 it is hard to see how such a content can contain the 
property of being damaged.13 
Second and more importantly, Crane claims that such a treatment is guaranteed 
by the fact that allegedly merely qualitative states have the two features that essentially 
qualify intentionality of reference, namely, the possible non-existence of the intentional 
object of an intentional state and the aspectual shape of (the intentional object of14) such 
a state. The possible non-existence of the intentional object of an intentional state, i.e., 
the object that state is about, consists in the fact that there may well be intentional states 
that are about objects that do not exist, as for instance Vladimir’s aforementioned 
looking for Godot. The aspectual shape of an intentional state consists in the fact that 
the object a state is ‘directed upon’ an object may well be given in a certain way, under 
10 For such labels, cf. Kim (1996:21). 
11 Cf. Crane (2001, 2003).  
12 Cf. Tye (1995:135). To be sure, for Tye the two overall conditions of the masochist and of the normal 
person phenomenally differ in the further feelings the two original states of the masochist and of the 
normal respectively go along with (a difference to be possibly interpreted in terms of further different 
content features). 
13 For a similar criticism see Crane himself (2001:85). 
14 For the sense of this aside see the following footnote. 
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a certain aspect. Given this aspectuality, one may not recognize that two states are 
‘directed upon’ the same object, insofar as this object is given in them in different ways 
respectively. For instance, Hammurabi thought of Venus both as the evening star and as 
the morning star without acknowledging that the two celestial bodies are nothing but the 
same entity.15 As a result, the qualitative properties of such states can be brought back 
to intentional properties of such states. 
This second point is even a greater merit of Crane’s theory. For at least with 
respect to certain allegedly merely qualitative states, namely moods and what may be 
called interoceptive, or better proprioceptive, sensations (pains and pleasures, but also 
itches and tingles, or even kinaesthetic sensations), intuitions seem to go in the anti-
intentionalist direction. Even in philosophy, up to some years ago it was quite natural to 
draw a distinction between qualitative and intentional states and to deny intentionality 
to the former ones – as Searle put it, the “of” in “I am aware of a pain” is not the “of” 
the intentionality.16 So, it’s quite important that an intentionalist tries to run counter 
such anti-intentionalist intuitions by providing arguments to the effect that the contrary 
point of view is the case. 
In this vein, Crane’s argument may be reconstructed as follows: 
 
1) In order for a state to be intentional, it is enough that it is ‘directed upon’ 
something (that it has aboutness, i.e., intentionality of reference) 
2) The necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of aboutness are: i) the possible 
non-existence of the intentional object; ii) the state’s aspectual shape 
3) Qualitative states satisfy these conditions 
4) Therefore, these states are ‘directed upon’ something 
5) Therefore, these states are intentional. 
 
Yet this ingenious way of arguing for intentionalism is doomed to fail. For one can well 
reject its premise 3): there are qualitative states that are not qualified by the necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions of intentionality, hence that possess no intentionality of 
reference. So, their qualitative properties are matched by no intentional properties. As a 
result, weak intentionalism fails; since strong intentionalism entails weak 
intentionalism, it collapses as well. As a further consequence, (BC) has to be 
abandoned. Intentionality is not even the ‘mark’ of the mental. 
In this respect, consider moods first. For Crane, a state of depression, a 
prototypical case of mood, is ‘directed upon’ the whole world as its intentional object.17 
15 Aspectual shape can also be described as a feature that directly affects the intentional object of a state: 
an intentional object of a state may present itself as the aspect of another entity, so that a relevant 
recognition occurs when one discovers that two different intentional objects present themselves as 
different aspects of a further entity. This way of describing aspectual shape traces back to Meinong 
([1916]1972). As to the present requirement, Tye (1995:133-4) stresses that reports involving allegedly 
merely qualitative states generate intensional contexts. Yet, as Crane Crane (1995:32-6), (2001:11) rightly 
underlines, the linguistic phenomenon of intensionality is at most a symptom of the mental phenomenon 
of aspectuality. 
16 Cf. Searle (1992:84). See also his (1983:1-2). 
17 “In depression, the world seems to the subject to be a pointless, colourless place: nothing seems worth 
doing. The change involved in coming out of a depression is partly a change in the subject’s apprehension 
of the world (1998:242). This idea is also shared by Lycan (2001:28). Yet Lycan adds that depression has 
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Now, given the above argument,  in order for a state of depression to be about 
something, it must be i) possibly about an object that does not exist and ii) such that that 
very object is given in a certain way. Yet it is unclear how one can feel oneself 
depressed towards a non-existent world and how depression can have an aspectual 
shape, that is, how the world can be given in one’s depression in a way that may well 
make its bearer fail to recognize that it is the same object differently given in another 
intentional state.18  
Crane’s rejoinder to this problem is that moods are complex mental states, so 
that first, they have to be reduced to simpler qualitative states that, second, can be 
shown to be intentional states.19 Yet consider pains, or any other intero or 
proprioceptive sensation for that matter. Crane acknowledges that pains are simple 
mental qualitative states. For him, moreover, their being pains can be traced back to the 
fact that they are ‘directed upon’ bodily parts. More precisely, such a ‘directionality’ 
makes pains objectual intentional states insofar as not only they may be ‘directed upon’ 
objects – bodily parts –  that do not exist but also they possess aspectual shape. On the 
one hand, the ‘phantom limb’- case shows that there are cases in which the intentional 
object of the sensation does not exist: in feeling pain in such a case, one indeed feels a 
bodily part that does not exist. On the other hand, it may well occur that a bodily part, 
say a leg, is presented in a certain way in a pain, yet it is not so presented when one is 
aware of that part in other sense modalities (e.g. in outer perception).20 
Once again, on behalf of Crane a more limited argument can be reconstructed as 
follows: 
 
1) In order for a state to be intentional, it is enough that it is ‘directed upon’ 
something (that it has aboutness, i.e., intentionality of reference) 
2) The necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of aboutness are: i) the possible 
non-existence of the intentional object; ii) the state’s aspectual shape 
3’) Proprioceptive sensations are characterized by both the possible non-existence of 
their intentional object and the sensation’s aspectual shape  
4’) Therefore, a proprioceptive sensation is ‘directed upon’ an object – which is a 
certain part of one’s body, the part one feels in one’s sensation 
5’) Therefore, these sensations are intentional. 
 
Once again, in the above argument the third premise, i.e. 3’), is the most important one. 
For it allows Crane to reject other possible objectualist accounts of the intentionality of 
proprioceptive sensations, such as the idea that a sensation has a sui generis intentional 
object, for example a pain is ‘directed upon’ a pain-object.21 Appealing to sensation-
a propositional intentional content. Since as I said I think that a propositionalist intentionalist account is 
independently problematic, I leave Lycan’s proposal aside.  
18 To be sure, this problem may be circumvented if by “the whole world” one does not mean an entire 
universe but just a very significant part of it, such as our Earth. (I owe this suggestion to Uriah Kriegel.) 
Yet this would implausibly mean that if one travelled across the universe her depression would change its 
object or even more radically, if as Crane believes the intentional object of a state individuates it – cf. 
(2001:82-3), it would become a different state. 
19 Cf. Crane (2009). 
20 Cf. Crane (2001:79-81).  
21 To be sure, Crane limits himself to saying that pain-objects are “obscure entities” (2001:81). 
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objects looks very much like a ‘Brentanian’ immanentist account according to which a 
proprioceptive sensation indeed is a merely objectual intentional state yet its intentional 
object is something that merely ‘in-exists’ in the state, i.e., it is an immanent entity that 
depends for its existence on the very existence of the state that is ‘directed upon’ it. Yet 
definitely, an immanent object does not allow the state allegedly ‘directed upon’ it to 
have the two features that qualify intentionality of reference. First of all, there are no 
non-existent immanent intentional objects: immanent objects always exist, though as we 
have just seen in a dependent form. Moreover, immanent objects do not allow the states 
allegedly ‘directed upon’ them to have an aspectual shape. For there is no chance that 
the immanent object a certain state is ‘directed upon’ and the immanent object another 
state is direction upon are nothing but the very same entity to be recognized as given in 
different ways. 
Now, 3’) seems to be well supported. For the ‘phantom limb’- case and the case 
in which one and the same entity is given in different ways in a pain and in another 
sensation respectively seem precisely to show that proprioceptive sensations possess the 
properties featuring reference intentionality, i.e., the possible non-existence of the 
intentional object of an intentional state and the aspectual shape of the state. However, it 
can be shown that premise 3’) of the above limited argument fails as well. Pains (or any 
other intero or proprioceptive sensation for that matter) are no objectual intentional 
states. For appearances notwithstanding, they do not possess the above features that 
admittedly qualify intentionality of reference. 
Let me begin with whether pains are qualified by the possible non-existence of 
the intentional object. Granted, we localize pains. We immediately ascribe to our pains a 
location, typically in a part of our body; quite unreflectively, we say that we feel a pain 
in our head, or in our leg. Yet such a practice does not per se provide a justification to 
the idea that pains are ‘directed upon’ bodily portions that might even not exist, as 
Crane holds. What the ‘phantom limb’- case merely shows is that the location we 
ascribe to our pains is merely apparent: for a pain to be ascribed a certain location is just 
to merely take it as being located in a certain part of the body, where such an ascription 
may well be false.22 Clearly this is how things stand is in the ‘phantom limb’- case, in 
which one locates a pain in a limb that does not exist. Yet there are other situations of 
the same kind that do not involve non-existent bodily parts, as when one locates an itch 
where one’s skin is not irritated.23  
So, we have at our disposal an alternative description of the phenomenon in 
question, pain localization, that does not support the idea that pain is an intentional state 
‘directed upon’ a certain bodily part. To be sure, Crane considers this suggestion yet 
just in order to discard it immediately: to localize a pain is something more, he says, 
22 If one likes, one may put things in the following terms: we truly ascribe our pains an appearance 
property, the property of seeming to be located at t in a certain bodily part. As Wittgenstein (1975:§61) 
originally suggested, such an appearance property may contribute to the individuation of the sensation in 
question, along with other features – e.g. intensity. For similar considerations, cf. Peacocke (2008:11-2). 
By later focusing on the case of migrant sensations, we will soon see why the temporal specification in 
such an appearance property is important. 
23 Possibly, this is the case as far as all pains are concerned, for if they have a genuine location, this is 
situated in our brain. Yet I cannot here deal with this point, which involves a materialist conception of 
pains (or of intero or proprioceptive sensations for that matter). 
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than to associate the sensation a belief (possibly false) in such a location.24 Yet pace 
Crane, to speak of an apparent location of a pain is not to associate the sensation a belief 
(possibly false) in such a location. Rather, it simply amounts to taking the sensation’s 
possession of that property as illusory, as in optical illusions. For example, when I see 
the oar in water as crooked I do not believe that the oar is crooked – I know that this is 
not the case – yet I am forced to so see it. 
An anti-intentionalist might even stop here. For she may appeal to the fact that, 
as we saw before, it is rather unintuitive to treat a proprioceptive sensation as an 
intentional state, as much as it was to analogously treat a mood: while we 
commonsensically think that states such as beliefs and outer perceptions have 
intentional objects, we have no intuition that not only moods but also intero or 
proprioceptive sensations have such objects, so that we incredulously stare at proposals 
that go along this direction. So, even if up to now the two stories concerning pains, the 
intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist, are on a par, given the pretheoretical intuitions, 
the burden of the proof is on the intentionalist to show that she is right. 
Yet there is more than that in favor of the anti-intentionalist story. Pains may be 
taken as located somewhere even in absence of any physical entity whatsoever, whether 
existent or not, corresponding to that location. As Wittgenstein originally said, it is not 
only conceivable, but also both metaphysically and nomologically possible, that one 
feels her pain not in her body, but in some other’s body: for instance, I may feel a pain 
in your teeth, or so one would say.25 Yet Wittgenstein’s example may be radicalized: 
one may feel a pain not only in someone else’s body, but also in some merely physical 
object – say, the armchair out there26 – or even in no physical object, but merely in the 
surrounding air, where no object at all is located nor it is erroneously said to be located 
(as in the ‘phantom limb’- case). In such a case, one would be prompted to say that one 
feels a pain in the air out there. (If one likes, one may tell a plausible story as to how 
such a case is nomologically, hence metaphysically, possible. As different laser rays 
fuse themselves in a certain location in the surrounding air, that location becomes the 
source from which a single laser ray is shoot against me. As such a ray directly hits my 
brain, my sensation-underlying neurons fire. Yet since the ray’s source is out there in 
the surrounding air, I am forced to say that I feel pain in that piece of air.)  Yet there 
would be no object, not even a non-existent one, that pain would be ‘directed upon’. So, 
pains are not even possibly ‘directed upon’ objects that do not exist. 
On behalf of Crane’s, one might reply to this putative counterexample by 
changing the kind of intentional object a pain is ‘directed upon’: rather than a bodily 
part, one may say that a pain is about the space region typically occupied by one such 
part. Accordingly, one may say that the pain in question is ‘directed upon’ a portion of 
space –the portion out there – which is simply occupied by no physical entity. Yet this 
reply has even more implausible consequences. Often, when we feel a certain pain, we 
move around in the surrounding space. Yet if the objects of our pains were space 
regions we would be oddily forced to say that a pain changes its object as soon as its 
24 Cf. Crane (2001:79-80). 
25 Cf. Wittgenstein (1975:§63). 
26 The example is suggested (but not endorsed) by Wittgenstein in his reflecting on muscular sensations 
as the basis for one’s will to act (cf. 1961:87-8). Rabdomants sometimes say that they feel something at 
the tip of their sticks. 
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bearer moves around. Moreover, if we individuate pains also by means of their 
intentional object, as Crane is inclined to say,27 we would be even forced to say that our 
pains become different mental states as we move around. 
Let me now pass to consider whether pains have aspectual shape. As I said 
before on behalf of Crane’s, ascribing aspectual shape to pains is prima facie plausible. 
For pains seem to mobilize discoveries of the same kind as those that are mobilized in 
the prototypical cases in which we discover that it is one and the same object that is 
given twice in two different intentional states respectively. In this respect, it seems that 
we can truly say things like “Aha! What I see is the leg that I feel” in the very same vein 
as when we truly say “the evening star is the morning star”. 
Yet a moment’s reflection shows that the above analogy is nothing more than an 
analogy. Informative identities in which one discovers that an object given in a certain 
way – say, the evening star – is nothing but another object given in another way – say, 
the morning star – are atemporal, or better longlasting. When one discovers that the 
evening star is the morning star, one discovers a fact that pre-existed to the discovery 
for it generated along with Venus’ own generation and will last at least as much as 
Venus exists. Yet whatever one discovers when one discovers that what one feels is e.g. 
what one sees, one discovers something temporal, or better ephemeral, something that 
obtains at the time of the discovery but it may well cease to obtain after it. 
This is clearly shown by the fact that pain can migrate, in the sense that we can 
well ascribe different locations to one and the same pain in different times. Migrant 
pains indeed show that the informative identities one may allegedly discover involving 
pains and bodily parts are at most temporalized identities: for example, one may 
discover that what one feels is at t the left big toe (that one then sees), but is at t’ the left 
index finger (that one then sees). Yet such temporalized identities ground no alleged 
aspectual character of the sensations involved, for such a character would rather require 
a non-temporalized identity of the “the evening star is the morning star”- type. 
One may see the situation at stake more deeply if one reflects on the fact that, as 
I said before, pain localization is nothing more than an ascription of location. For one 
may then clearly see that speaking of temporalized identities is just a rough way of 
talking of what’s really going on. Insofar as they are migrant, pains are ascribed 
different locations in different times. Such locations are described in terms of bodily 
parts, but they should be better described in terms of the space regions that such bodily 
parts occupy (in case such parts exist). So what it is really going on in the situation at 
stake is that now (a certain bit of time) one (says that one) feels a certain pain in this 
place, which is the place that (say) one’s left big toe occupies, and now (another bit of 
time) one (says that one) feels that very pain in this other place, which is the place that 
(say) one’s left index finger occupies.28 Granted, these latter identities – this place is the 
place that one’s left big toe occupies, this other place is the place that one’s left index 
finger occupies – are non-temporalized identities of the “the evening star is the morning 
star” – kind. Yet clearly enough, such identities ground no alleged aspectual character 
of the sensation. 
27 Cf. fn. 18. 
28 In the ‘phantom limb’- case, since the limb in question does not exist, it occupies no space region. As a 
result, an identity of the kind “this place (where one locates one’s sensation) is the place that one’s limb 
occupies” would be false.  
 
                                                 
12 
 
To be sure, Crane may appeal to his conviction that the intentional object of a 
sensation individuates it in order to say that what one feels at t, namely one’s big left 
toe, is a certain sensation, while what one feels at t’, namely one’s left index finger, is 
another sensation, insofar as they are individuated by different intentionalia – one’s big 
left toe and one’s left finger. To be sure, one would then have genuinely non-
temporalized identities at one’s disposal – what one feels at t is the big left toe (one then 
sees), what one feels at t’ is the left index finger (one then sees) – that would enable one 
to account for the sensations’ aspectuality.  
Yet this move would amount to denying the datum of migrant sensations, which 
states that what one feels at t and what one feels at t’ are one and the same sensation. 
Such a denial would rather be ad hoc, since Crane would not deny diachronical identity 
to a pain when its alleged object remains the same in different times (Crane would 
surely admit that e.g. my headache at t is the same as my headache at t’ insofar as they 
are allegedly ‘directed upon’ the same part of my brain.) 
At this point, a defender of Crane’s version of intentionalism might be tempted 
by the following amendment of Crane’s own position. Instead of holding that the 
intentional object of a pain (or more generally of a proprioceptive sensation) is a portion 
of a physical body (Körper), Crane might say that such an object is rather a portion of a 
lived body (Leib), the lived target of one’s sensations postulated by Husserl (1989 
[1913]).  
To be sure, there are reasons to defend the idea that, pace Gallagher and 
Zahavi,29 a lived body is not epistemologically, but rather ontologically different from a 
physical body: that is, a lived and a physical body are not two ways for identifying one 
and the same entity, but are genuinely different entities (of a different kind, a physical 
and a phenomenological one). For the two entities may well be different, insofar they 
differ in their extension. As the ‘phantom limb’- case (as well as our previous 
hypothetical cases) shows, a lived body may be broader than a physical body (the limb 
in such a case is my limb, although my physical body has no such limb). The opposite, 
i.e., that a lived body is narrower than a physical body, is also true, insofar as there are 
parts of one’s physical body that display no sensibility (e.g. the veins of one’s physical 
body are not one’s veins, for one feels nothing in them).30  
Moreover, there are independent reasons as to why one may commit to lived 
bodies. Consider the following argument that Crane borrows from Block and appears to 
be invalid: 
 
i) The pain is in my hand 
ii) My hand is in my trousers 
iii) Hence, the pain is in my trousers.31 
 
As Crane says, the argument may be regarded as invalid for it suffers from a fallacy of 
equivocation. Yet instead of locating the fallacy, as Crane explicitly does, in a different 
meaning the preposition “in” has in the two premises – according to him, in i) “in” 
29 Cf. Gallagher, Zahavi (2008:136). 
30 In the same vein, Wittgenstein once said (1975:§64) that it is unconceivable that we feel pains at the tip 
of our (physical) nails or at our (physical) hairs. 
31 Cf. Crane (2001:81). 
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means intentional individuation (the state of pain is individuated by its putative object, 
i.e., the hand in question), while in ii) “in” has it ordinary locative meaning32 – one 
might say that the description “my hand” is ambiguous in the two premises, by denoting 
a part of one’s lived body in (i) and a part of one’s physical body in (ii). 
 To be sure, the above reason is not so cogent. If one accepts that pain 
localization may well amount to a false ascription, the argument may be valid and yet 
unsound, for simply its premise i) may well be false. As a result, one may well not be 
committed to lived bodies. Be that as it may, armed with lived bodies a follower of 
Crane may reject the counterexamples I have previously provided to the idea that pains 
have intentionality. First, the example of a pain localized in the surrounding air does not 
show that pain has no intentional object at all, but it rather shows that it has as such an 
object my air, as a part of my lived body – as I noted above, in such a case the relevant 
subject would indeed say that such a pain is in the air out there pretty much as one 
ordinarily says that a pain is in the hand. Second, the case of migrant pains would 
simply show that one’s pain changes its object, it is first about my left big toe and then 
about my left index finger, inasmuch as at t I feel it in the left big toe while at t’ I feel it 
in the left index finger. 
Yet in a Cranian perspective this amendment fares no better. Let me even put 
aside the problematic fact that, since Crane believes in the idea that the intentional 
object of a sensation individuates it, in the amendment he would still be forced to deny 
the datum of migrant sensations. For what we would have at our disposal would be a 
certain sensation at t (individuated by my left big toe) and another sensation at t’ 
(individuated by my left index finger). For the amendment entails the even more 
problematic fact for him that, if (a portion of) the lived body is the intentional object of 
a pain, then such an object is again a Brentanian immanent object, an object that 
depends on its existence on the existence of a living subject. My body is different from 
your body insofar as the former depends on me for its existence, while the latter 
depends on you for its existence. Yet as we have seen before Crane himself maintains 
that ascribing to a state a Brentanian immanent object does not happily account for the 
fact that such a state has intentionality of reference, understood in terms of the afore-
mentioned essential features of being possibly about something that does not exist and 
having an aspectual shape. For there cannot be a non-existent part of a lived body, my 
lived body as well as its parts simply “in-exist”, i.e., they exist in a dependent way (on 
myself, as we have just seen). To put in the most extreme terms, even a brain in a vat 
has an existent lived body, so to say In this perspective, therefore, all intentionalia of 
sensation exist, insofar as they “in-exist”. It is then not the case that my phantom limb 
does not exist, for it exists, as well as all the parts of my lived body.  Nor states about 
portions of a lived body can have aspectual shape. For in order for the object of a pain 
to be recognized as being the same object given in different ways in different sensations 
respectively, that object must be a physical object (as Crane had in mind when saying 
that identities of the kind “what I feel is the leg I see” display one such recognition – the 
leg in question is one’s physical, not one’s lived, leg). 
If all this is the case, then weak intentionalism fails. For the above remarks show 
that the fact that a state of pain (or any other proprioceptive sensation) has qualitative 
32 Cf. Crane (2001:82-3). 
 
                                                 
14 
 
features cannot be matched by its having an objectual intentional content, hence by its 
having intentional properties. A fortiori, also strong intentionalism fails. As a further 
result, intentionality is not the mark of the mental, not even in the (BC) sense, for any 
such state is merely qualitative. 
 
3. An alternative mark of the mental 
 
If intentionality is not the mark of the mental, not even in the (BC) sense, then whatever 
affects intentionality does not eo ipso affect mentality. For instance, suppose it turned 
out that the naturalization program regarding intentionality failed, so that intentionality 
is a non-natural property.33 Yet if it is not the case that all mental states are intentional, 
then if intentionality is not natural this does not mean that mental states are non-natural 
entities, or at least that all mental states are such. 
 Yet such a predicament seems to have a bad consequence. As Crane again has 
pointed out, if there were non-intentional qualitative states, for something to be a mental 
state would merely be an empty disjunctive characterization: mental states would 
merely be either intentional states or qualitative states. Being mental would therefore be 
something not very informative indeed.34 
 Yet to say that intentionality is not the mark of the mental, not even in the (BC) 
sense, does not mean that there are no other candidates that may successfully play this 
role. In the phenomenological tradition, Husserl (1970 [1900]) suggested that being 
conscious, rather than being intentional, is that mark: something is mental (if) and only 
if it is conscious, in the sense that it is experienced, at least nomologically possibly (as 
Searle would put it) 35: an idea that nowadays some people also defend.36  Probably 
Crane himself would look with favor at such an idea.37 He indeed believes that being 
mental amounts to presenting itself to a subject, even though he further articulates such 
a belief (erroneously to my mind) in intentionalist terms, i.e., as if presentedness were 
for a state to be perspectival, to have aspectuality.38  Yet such an idea may be meant as 
the claim that any mental state has a phenomenal character, either sensuous or non-
sensuous (depending on whether the state is a qualitative or an intentional state). 
Something Crane himself positively endorses.39  
One may immediately reply that if this move obviously covers all qualitative 
states – phenomenal awareness affects all of them – it does not cover all intentional 
states. According to this move, dispositional inner states having intentionality insofar as 
they can’t be accessed; they are merely informational states. But perhaps this is a price 
worth paying. We are indeed ready to consider sub-personal intentional states, states 
33 As I personally believe (cf. e.g. my Voltolini 2002). 
34 Cf. Crane (1998:250). 
35 Cf. Searle (1992:159-62). 
36 Cf. e.g. Strawson (1994, 2004). 
37 As Brentano himself originally did, by substantially accepting that all mental states are conscious (in 
his terms, are objects of inner perception). Cf. (1874:91). 
38 Cf. Crane (2001:4-6,31). 
39 Cf. Crane (2001:75-6). The terminological distinction between sensuous and non-sensous phenomenal 
character comes from Maund (2003:37). Yet the point is well-established in the literature: cf. also 
Strawson (1994:6-7), McCulloch (2003:10). 
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that cannot in principle be experienced, as merely informational states.40 Consider for 
instance a non-conscious state of vision, such as the one an eminegligent subject or 
another subject whose brain has been injured may entertain. Although the reactions of 
such a subject may prove that she entertains such a state for it gives her some 
information about the world, insofar as she has no awareness of it this state may well be 
regarded as non-mental. In this respect, note that Crane himself holds that there is a 
difference between dispositional states and occurrent intentional states: insofar as only 
the latter are experienced, a dispositional belief and an occurrent thought are entities of 
a different kind.41  Now, this difference is well accounted for if one precisely holds that 
unlike occurrent thoughts, dispositional states of belief are not mental states, but merely 
informational states. For although they provide some information about the world, they 
are not experienced, nor can they. 
To be sure, since also these informational states are relevant in order to account 
for the behavior of the subject entertaining them, we need another category linking 
together such states and mental states qua experienced states. It may even be the case 
that, if it turned out that being experienced makes no functional difference as regards 
both mental states and corresponding underlying informational states – e.g. it turned out 
that both conscious and inconscious vision prompt in their similarly stimulated subjects 
the same kind of behavior, as some experiments seem to show –42 then being mental is 
an epiphenomenal feature of the state that possesses it. Yet this a story for another 
work.43  
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